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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of the transformations and the changing notions of 
the national and international security, especially by the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) in Greek policies. In this frame, it discusses the debate over “new wars”, as 
one that incorporates the rhetoric of globalization, the increasing role of information 
technologies, as well as the “preemptive wars” as response to “new threats”. Furthermore, 
this paper discusses the development of the ESDP and categorizes different sets of arguments 
that focus on the relationship between ESPD and the nation state. These sets of arguments 
refer to the EU as an emerging global superpower, as an agent of governmentality in 
agendas of “good governance” and “humanitarian intervention”, as a response to the 
decline of nation states in the frame of globalization and also, as a coalition where the 
nation state remains predominant and operates as a reference level for the EU. As far as 
Greece is concerned, this paper summarizes its basic foreign policy features, the problem of 
its high defence expenditure, its participation to several ESDP-institutions, police missions 
and peace- keeping operations, as well as problems that concern both the EU and Greece as 
a border and transition country, such as the migration from belligerent countries.  
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1. The changing agenda of security and defence 
 
The post Cold war era, especially the period after September 11th, and the 
beginning of the US “war on terrorism” are considered as an era of “new wars” and 
“new threats” for international security (Kaldor 2003, Wulf 2005). These “new 
wars” are no more understood as conflicts between nation-states (inter-state 
conflicts), especially between Western nation-states, but as “non-state wars”. They 
are characterized by the intensification of “low-intensity” and “intra-state” conflicts 
by ethno-cultural conflicts as in Yugoslavia, urban, asymmetric warfare as in the 
case of the Israel-Palestine conflict, guerilla-fighting as in the zone of Afghanistan-
Pakistan (“Afpak” war) or “small wars” but most of all by threats defined as 
“terrorist”, as in the case of Al Qaida and Taliban. This debate over the “new wars” 
is based on three fundamental arguments.  
a) Globalization. In this argument, globalization is thought to have caused 
loss of control over national governments and their military forces, because of the 
rapid flow of migration, weapons, information and illegal transactions (Wulf 2005). 
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War exceeds nation states and is being informalized through the intensive 
participation and empowerment of warlords, members of the organized crime, gangs 
and private militias. These non-state bodies, war professionals and clan militias in 
“shadow states” and in “war economies” fight for resources, power and leadership, 
creating in this way new cores of “insecurity” for the international stability (Wulf 
2005: 197). Therefore, the disorder and the uncertainty that is caused by 
globalization demand a more effective control over these groups. However, such 
efforts require more than merely a confrontation by national armies and their regular 
forces. They require international cooperation and coordination for special 
complicated operations and doctrines grounded on joint force flexibility. The 
maximal effect of cooperation is required not only between the different military 
units and ΝΑΤΟ, but also between NATO, the EU, public and private actors, states 
and INGOs, or even between states and private military and security companies.  
b) The increasing role of information. This argument stretches the role of 
information technology on “new wars”. The debate around the so called “Revolution 
in Military Affairs” (RMA), as it developed after the end of Cold war and 
intensively after September 11th, has dramatically influenced modern defence 
agendas2. RMA incorporates a broad discussion on the modernization and 
professionalization of the army and its adjustment through high technology to new 
forms of “flexible”, “targeted” and “information-centric” operations in the frame of 
“asymmetric” warfare. Through the use of high-tech and networking practices, 
RMA’s two main targets are the minimalization of casualties (“risk free warfare”) 
and the precision in military operations (“precision warfare”). This kind of 
“information” and “digital” warfare includes unmanned aircrafts, non-detectable 
drones and radar-satellites that can chart and spy from a great distance for purposes 
of aerial photography, data mining and espionage. RMA-techniques include 
“precision guided munitions, “smart bombs” or laser-guided bombs. At the same 
time, the so called “digital soldiers” at the “digital battlefield” have the possibility to 
penetrate the battlefield virtually, use precision techniques and munitions while they 
remain hidden with the option of changing each time their plans, paralyze and 
exterminate small or larger targets from a great distance. (For an overview about 
RMA see Sørensen 2004: 130, Gray 2005, Arquilla 2007). 
                                                            
2 The RMA-debate had already started since the Cold War, it was systematized after the end 
of the Vietnam War in 1975, it was spread after the end of the Cold War and was intensified 
by the “war on terror”. At its initial state, because of its geopolitical position, the idea that 
the US could not stand with ground in Europe as the Soviets would if such a war possibility 
arose, drove to the development of a strategy less based on soldiery and more on air force 
and on strategies of awareness through information. When the war in Vietnam ended, RMA 
focused on the ways they would reduce casualties and victims and it was confirmed in the 
political agenda through “Powell’s doctrine” about the “war without casualties”. This was 
introduced because of the Vietnam experience and because the US refused to take part in a 
war abroad without rational aspirations of victory and would not risk any human lives 
without important strategic reasons. 
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c) The rhetoric of human rights and the preemptive wars. This argument 
refers to the rhetoric of “human rights”, as one that establishes a set of priorities, 
social values and aims that attempt to exceed the nation state. In a context of 
changing perceptions of “threat”, sovereign states hold the power to instrumentalize 
human rights, defining them according to their criteria and engaging them to 
“preemptive” wars and “humanitarian operations”. The triple action of preemptive 
violence, state building and humanitarian assistance has become a fundamental 
factor for the superpowers of the post-Cold War era, as in the cases of Afghanistan 
and Iraq. This blend between violence and humanitarian operations invested in the 
rhetoric of human rights, undermines the sovereignty of “weak” or “failed” states. It 
has also legitimized military operations for the protection from leaderships and 
groups considered as “dangerous” for the international stability as well as from 
“rogue states” that are considered to sponsor and support “terrorists”. At the same 
time, preemptive wars, “chirurgical operations” and the “total war” (where old 
distinctions between military and civilians are blurring) have become dominant 
practices of modern military superpowers and international actors (see 
Sakellaropoulos/Sotiris 2008: 15). This emphasis on human rights and preemption 
requires new forms of cooperation between international actors and necessitates an 
empowerment of their tasks. 
The above sets of arguments illustrate a shift in the understanding of both 
national and international security. New definitions of “threat”, the current trend of 
intrastate and low-intensity conflicts and the threat of the defined as such 
“terrorism” as well as the new forms of high-tech warfare, initiate a process of 
“securitization”. As the American National Security Strategy in 2010 and the 
Provisions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 
show, the above developments effect increasingly the ways with which powers such 
as the US and the European Union implement new forms of social control and adopt 
new practices, policies and strategies at the level of security and defence. The 
project of the European security and defence policy is neither new, nor is it simply a 
product of the threat of terrorism after September 11th. However, its social dynamics 
appear more intensive after the end of the Cold War and over the last decade.  
 
2. The European Security and Defence Policy 
  
The idea of a common European security and defence policy has been in the 
process of development since the European Convention in 1991 that announced a 
perspective of cooperation in the future. During the Cold War, efforts such as the 
Fouchet Plan, the European Defence Community and the European Political 
Cooperation have not resulted into a substantial cooperation (Jones 2007: 14). Τhe 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 emphasized the need for cooperation and inserted the 
pillars of Justice and Home Affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), which intended to intensify the convergence of the EU’s state-members to 
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the direction of common evaluations of security threats. Thereafter, the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1997, apart from elaborations in the judicial and policing levels, led also to 
the creation of a High Representative in charge of foreign policy. In 1998, a French-
British Summit agreed at St. Malo on an important Declaration3. Although it 
introduced the ambiguous concept of the “autonomous action” of the EU, the need 
to buttress institutional defence foundations was for the first time prioritized, so that 
the Declaration became, as Merand (2008:118) notes, a “conceptual breakthrough”, 
which consisted of “a step forward in papering over social representations and 
authorizing officials to engage more deeply in reconfiguring the European security 
architecture”. Following this development, the Cologne European Council launched 
the European Security and Defence Policy (hereafter ESDP) in 1999, as a special 
sector of the Common Foreign and Security Policy4. ESDP’s declared aims were the 
creation of a unified defence and security agency, the harmonization of national 
equipments, the promotion of research and technology related to defence and the 
creation of a competitive European defence industry. Subsequent to the Nice Treaty 
in 2001, the Joint Action of the Council of Ministers established in 2004 the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) in order to promote actions for the empowerment 
of defence capabilities, crisis management, strategic intelligence and European 
security. EDA’s priorities were the setting of a common defence agenda in the 
context of the ESDP. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty5 in 2007 established the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) stretching the need for strengthening and 
deepening the cooperation on issues of defence, equipment harmonization and a 
common asylum and border legislation. Under the clause of “mutual solidarity” of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU should provide military assistance, if one of its members 
suffers from a terrorist attack (for the EU treaties with regard to security and defence 
see Merlingen/Ostraukaite 2006, Jones, 2007, Merand 2008, Grevi/Helly/Kehoane 
2009).  
ESDP is organized inter-governmentally and it is therefore important to 
underline that it neither interferes as an outside international power to the defence 
policy of the EU’s member states, nor does it conflict with NATO principles. It does 
not create a unified European Army and does not collide with the sovereignty of the 
nation state or with the countries’ parallel participation to NATO. In this sense, both 
the national structure of defence and security policy and NATO’s international 
                                                            
3 Among other positions, the St Malo Declaration stated that “the Union must have the 
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces and the means to 
decide to use them and a willingness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.  
Furthermore, “Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks 
and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and 
technology”                                                                    (see 
http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html). 
4 See http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-security-defence-policy-archived/article-
117486 
5 See http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm 
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character are not substituted by the ESDP. Europe is neither a homogenous mega-
state, nor a constitutionally legitimized and institutionally harmonized entity. Until 
now, the states-members’ geopolitical and strategic interests and targets are not 
necessarily identical or equally urgent. States maintain different defence priorities, 
risk perceptions and military traditions.  
However, the dynamics of the cooperation between European countries at 
the level of security and defence is being intensified over the last two decades. The 
end of the Cold War innovated an unipolar accumulation of power in the hands of 
the USA instead of the former bipolarity between the US and the Soviet Union. This 
unipolar accumulation has impelled Europe to search for perspectives, in order to 
ensure long-term peace in the continent, increase its ability to project power abroad 
and decrease reliance on the United States (Jones 2007: 15). Gradually, after the end 
of the Cold War, despite the lack of coherence between European societies and the 
lack of willingness of national populations, as the French and Dutch veto of the 
European Constitution in 2005 showed, the dynamics of cooperation for security and 
defence at the governmental level has been intensified. As a result, several 
institutions, common actions and undertaken operations constitute gradual steps 
towards a common basis of security and defence. Indicatively, such actions include: 
• Eurocorps, located in Strasburg, was formed in 1992 with the participation 
of France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxemburg in order to gradually establish 
a European military unit that in cooperation with NATO or distinctively, would 
undertake military, humanitarian and peace keeping operations, as in the case of the 
NATO-EU operations in Kosovo6.  
• Eurofor (European Operational Rapid Force), located in Florence, was 
formed in 1995 with the participation of France, Spain, Italy and Portugal and was 
later assimilated in the ESDP. It is consisted of a permanent multinational stuff for 
the promotion of the Petersburg Declaration, which in 1992 decided that countries 
from the Western European Union (WEU) could undertake humanitarian and peace 
keeping missions7.  
• The European Union Battle-Groups (EUBG) are complementary with the 
NATO Response Force (NRF). They are part of the Headline Goal 2010, initially 
launched by the Headline Goal 1999 in Helsinki, with the ambition of a Rapid 
Reaction Force of 60.000 troops. At the moment, 15 EU-Battlegroups are 
established, each consisting of 1500 soldiers, operationally deployable within 15 
days, for a period from 30 to 120 days. Equipments and troops are provided by the 
member states under a lead nation. In the frame of the 2007 “Full Operational 
Capability” of the European Security Strategy, they can undertake humanitarian and 
rescue operations, crisis management tasks, joint disarmament operations, and 
                                                            
6 See http://www.eurocorps.org/ 
7 See http://www.eurofor.it/ 
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provide support for third countries such as institution building within the NATO and 
UN agenda8.  
• The European Union Police (EUROPOL), located in The Hague, was set up 
in 1992 in order to deal with issues of terrorism, human trafficking, organized crime, 
migration, drug and vehicle trafficking. Exchange of information between the EU 
member states, information gathering, investigations and operations take place 
within the EU, under the Justice and Home Affairs Council9. 
• Frontex, located in Warsaw, was set up in 2004 in order to promote borders 
policing in Europe for the control of migration. Its tasks include: risk analysis and 
evaluation of consequences, cooperation at the field of management of external 
borders, promotion of common training standards of the national border guards 
through the system of the “new European Curriculum” which functions as a code for 
the establishment of common skills and competencies for the basic training of 
border guards. Also, Frontex examines the research relevant to the control of 
external borders and digital surveillance technologies, assists operationally member 
states and cooperates with national military and police agents as well as with other 
police institutions such as EUROPOL10.   
• The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), located in Vicenza, was formed 
in 2004 with the participation of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, 
while Romania also entered in 2008. EGF aims at the field of the civil security, 
crime prevention, crisis management by police forces and cooperation between 
police and military at the disposal of the EU, NATO and UN11.  
       
 
3. ESDP and the nation states   
 
EU’s economical, social and political formation has been over the last 
decades in the center of political analysis. The numerous approaches with the main 
focus on the relationship between the EU and the nation state illustrate at the same 
time different views about the role and the future of ESDP. These approaches can be 
summarized as following: 
1) EU as a superpower at the global level. Contrary to mainstream visions 
of a Euro-Atlantic alliance as an expression of the common “Western” perspective, 
this approach theorizes the EU as a forthcoming superpower, autonomously from the 
US. Through the structuring of its own economy, military, policing, judicial and 
political system and a corresponding institutional progress, several developments 
may result into competitions between the EU and the US. In the frame of this 
                                                            
8 Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Directorate B, Policy Department, 
European Parliament, Note: The EU-Battlegroups, 2006   
9 See http://www.europol.europa.eu/ 
10 See http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ 
11 See http://www.eurogendfor.org/ 
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argument, the US – especially after September 11th – is, in the face of its war fronts 
in the Middle East, in a process of gradual faltering. The increase of global rivalries 
and struggles for power at international level will force the EU to the empowerment 
of ESDP, because of the inability of the US to confront new threats alone. A 
dynamic ESDP will gradually turn the EU into a powerful “super state”, as Haseler 
(2004) names it. According to Haseler’s (2004: 3) view, “more than by policies and 
constitutions coming out of Brussels or Strasbourg, a new European superpower will 
be built in the crucible of global rivalry and conflict, in global economic crises, in 
future conflicts along Europe’s long borders and, above all, in Europe’s response to 
American economic and military power”.  
2) EU as a response to the decline of the nation state. This approach 
conceptualizes nation states as weakening political entities. Globalization, 
transnational neoliberal capitalism and the consequent deregulation of national 
welfare states and institutional regimes, the empowered role of political federations 
like the EU, international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, NGOs 
and INGOs, as well as the decreasing importance of territorial sovereignty and the 
flow of information are considered as factors that have challenged the sovereignty of 
the nation state, its cohesion and its monopoly of violence (for an overview of these 
approaches see Markantonatou 2005). Therefore, the empowerment of ESDP is a 
defensive reaction to globalization and an effort to response adequately to new 
security problems connected to globalization, such as threats defined as “terrorist”, 
migration, organized crime, transnational weapons and guns circulation etc. Such 
problems exceed nation states and cannot be confronted without deepening the 
interaction and cooperation between the EU member states.   
3) The nation state as a reference level for the EU. This approach considers 
the nation state as a reference level for the EU and emphasizes the “predominance of 
the nation state” (Voigt 1996: 229). This predominance is based on the constant role 
of the state in maintaining the conditions of the economic reproduction and in 
balancing interests, demands and conflicting social values in order to promote social 
order. At the same time, political parties remain national. Their discourse is that of 
the “national interest” and of a nationally defined “common good”. As Voigt (ibid.) 
assumes, “the nation state is not disappearing from politics. More than that, within 
the general trend towards internationalization on the one hand and regionalization on 
the other, the nation state is a central reference level for political parties, interest 
groups etc., and especially for the voters”. In this approach, the EU cannot succeed 
in establishing a powerful ESDP, because states keep their own strategic and 
military agendas, while their first priority remains their own national military forces. 
Therefore, because ESDP is secondary, it cannot replace national security and 
defence agencies and can only operate complementarily to the nation states, their 
aims, plans and priorities.   
4) EU as a body of governance. In a Foucauldian line of analysis, this 
approach considers the EU as a body of governmentality. For instance, Merlingen 
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and Ostrauskaite analyze in their study about the European peace-building and 
policing operations the basic repertoire of technologies, the mechanisms and the 
modi operandi of these operations. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2006: 29) challenge 
what they describe as the “commonsensical view that ESDP police missions are 
‘weak’ because they are small-scale operations lacking the means to use big sticks 
and juicy carrots to reform the security sector in divided countries”. To this end, 
they draw on governmentality theory as opposed to traditional theories of power as 
sovereignty and to paradigms of political realism. The focus of the governmentality 
approach is on capillary, non-sovereign forms of power that illustrate how “ESDP 
police missions refashion, reposition and reorganize law enforcement officials in 
host societies” (ibid.). As the authors note (ibid.: 124), “task of non-executive ESDP 
police missions is not to conserve a precarious peace, defeat spoilers of a peace 
settlement or maintain public order. Rather, they foster and mould capacities for 
action (…) with a view to making the conduct of locals consistent with EU 
objectives”. Instead of a linear exercise of power, the EU bodies in such operations 
mobilize through a series of administrative forms discourses of “truth”, 
professionalization and “scientific” knowledge. In this sense, EU’s operations do not 
aim at a total intervention in places considered as transitional or violent, but at an 
effective management of these places and at the socialization of ideologies and 
practices of “good governance”. As Merlingen and Ostrauskaite assume (ibid: 110), 
“the governmentalization (…) has become a powerful post-Cold War instrument of 
the West to shape the institutional trajectory of state apparatuses transiting from 
instability or violence with a view to making them secure for Western-style liberal 
peace”. The legitimacy of these operations is based on the general premises of the 
disciplinary, security-orientated neoliberal societies of the broader West and are, as 
the authors describe (ibid.), “rationalized and legitimized in the ahistorical, acultural 
and acontextual idiom of rational-legal authority and economic rationality”.  
These approaches highlight deferent aspects of the relationship between the 
EU and the nation state. Conflicts or controversies between the EU and the US are 
likely to appear in the future, although the complex of their common interests can 
hardly drive to a serious rupture. ESDP does not replace national armies and what 
Voigt (1996: 229) describes as the “predominance of the nation state” is not, for the 
present, challenged by the development of ESDP. On the other hand, ESDP 
indicates a direction towards institutional chaining, cooperation and identification of 
political values at the fields of security. This form of social control as conducted by 
ESDP establishes a set of governmentality mechanisms, intensifies a process of 
securitization both of national and international politics and creates new distinctions 
between “inside” and “outside” as well as new forms of social exclusion of places, 
populations, groups and individuals considered as threatening or incompatible to the 
EU’s general political agenda and its ideological orientations.  
 
 
 
 
Effects of the “European Security and Defence Policy” in Greece 
 
 
 
53 
4. Greece and the ESDP 
 
Except for the period 1974-1980, Greece has been a member of NATO since 
1952, member of the European Community since 1981 and a member of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since 2002. Through the consolidation of the 
political system after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974 and despite the deep 
ideological and political controversies within the Greek society, Greek governments 
gradually considered the European perspective as a factor of economic 
empowerment and stability in its foreign affairs. ESDP’s dynamics increased 
through the creation of various institutions, agreements and conventions from 1990s 
onwards. From the mid 1990s and through the politics of “modernization”12, 
Greece’s priority has been to integrate several aspects of the tension with Turkey to 
the European foreign policy agenda. The idea was that through the assimilation of 
the rivalries between Greece and Turkey in the European agenda, the relation 
between the two neighbor countries would be normalized and Greece would be 
relieved from a vicious circle of high equipment expenditures, operational costs, 
safety anxieties and nationalistic deadlocks.  
However, the Greek proposal for a clause of “solidarity and guarantee of the 
external borders” was rejected at the Amsterdam session in 1996, as long as EU’s 
policy would be not to involve in a possible conflict between an EU/NATO country 
(Greece) and a NATO country (Turkey) (Ntokos/Tsakonas 2004: 36). With regard to 
ESDP, the resolution of conflicts and the normalization of the tensions between 
Greece and Turkey did not fall directly into the interests’ agenda of the strongest 
EU-states. Furthermore, Lisbon’s “mutual solidarity” clause has been subjected to a 
series of legal restrictions and elaborations from national judicial systems, for 
instance by the German Constitutional Court, so that its potential in deepening 
ESDP that would benefit the Greek defence agenda, is blocked by strictly national 
interests and priorities (Kotzias 2010: 129).  
As a result of the rivalries between Greece and Turkey and despite Greece’s 
membership in the EU, Greek governments have not been able to reduce budgets for 
defence expenditure. High defence expenditures are one of the most striking features 
of the Greek defence policy, closely related to evaluations of threat and danger by 
                                                            
12 Priorities and narratives of the so called “modernization” denoted a political trend towards 
“Europeanization”. The concept of Europeanization accumulated narratives of institutional 
restructuring in the public administration, socio-political representations of state 
effectiveness and order, as well as priorities of convergence with EU’s economic and 
political criteria. However, in 2010, the appeal to the International Monetary Fund and the 
budgetary European Consolidation Pact under the conjuncture of the Greek debt crisis, have 
challenged the rhetoric of “modernization” as “Europeanization” and arose questions about 
the efficiency of Europe in confronting economic crises and securing peripheral, smaller 
economies in neoliberal circumstances.       
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defence policy agents. These expenditures have caused one of Greece’s most 
important economic problems and one that Europeanization did not manage to ease. 
In the 1990s, expenditures for equipment have reached remarkably high amounts, 
both for Greece and Turkey (Ntokos/Tsakonas 2004: 37). Recent data show that six 
countries, the UK, France, Germany and Italy, Holland and Spain cover around 80 
per cent of the total EU defence spending, but if Greece, Poland, Sweden and 
Belgium are added, it emerges that only 10 countries out of the 27 account for 90 
per cent of the total EU defence spending (Grevi 2009: 79).  
Greece is one of the countries with the highest defence expenditure both per 
capita and as a percentage of GDP. In 2008, Greek defence expenditure covered 
2,55% of the Greek GDP, while for instance France spent 2,32% and Germany spent 
1,27% of their GDP13. As Ntokos (2007: 21) describes, “Greek defence expenditure 
exceed to a great degree the average both of the EU and NATO. Indicatively, in 
2004 they amounted 4,2% of the GDP, which is double of the EU and NATO 
average for the same year”. Greek defence expenditures appear amongst the highest 
in Europe not only with regard to equipment procurement, but also at different 
levels. Apart from equipments, high expenditure in Greece are also directed to 
programs of “Research and Development” (R&D) and “Research and Technology” 
(R&T), namely expenditure for basic research and technology. While its military 
infrastructure and construction expenditure remain relatively low, Greece is the 
country with the greatest number of military personnel after France, Germany, the 
UK and Italy and with an amount of almost 12.000 civilian personnel in 200814.  
 
The levels and the ways ESDP influenced the Greek security and defence 
agenda as parts of its foreign policy can be summarized as following:  
1) The Greek participation in ESDP institutions and operations. At the level 
of participation in ESDP, Greece’s role is centered to operations of policing and 
humanitarian assistance. Because of its special geographical position, Greece is 
influential in the Balkans zone, the Mediterranean and the Greater Middle East, 
which is observed by NATO, the EU and Turkey, for its stability – in the sense of a 
specific allocation of power in the area – interests all parts. This position increased 
Greece’s involvement to operations of policing and humanitarian relief at the post-
conflict level. Indeed, in the frame of the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2002, which 
forwarded the cooperation between the EU and NATO and set a series of NATO 
facilities at EU’s disposal, the EU has undertaken numerous “peace operations” 
together with NATO, such as the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Greece 
has taken action together with other countries in EU-operations such as the 
“Operation Concordia” in FYROM15, the “Operation Artemis” in Congo, the 
                                                            
13 See European Defence Agency: Defence Data of EDA participating Member States in 
2008. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Concordia took place from 3.03 to 10.12 2003 and was one of the first operations that the 
EU took over by attempting to be present as “a body of international security”. Tasks of the 
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“Operation Althea” in Bosnia, but also in operations such as the EU Police Mission 
for the Palestinian Territories (for an overview of the EU peace operations see 
Grevi/Helly/Kehoane 2009), while there are some on-going operations such as the 
NATO-ISAF operation in Afghanistan16. In these operations, all bodies have 
engaged a coordination with NATO and INGOs for both civil and military crisis 
management, security establishment, local conflict resolution and humanitarian aid. 
Furthermore, in 2002, Greece and Turkey, as NATO members, integrated 
personnel into Eurocorps, while in the frame of the Helsinki Headline Goals, Greece 
joins a EU-battlegroup together with Spain, Italy and Portugal and also the 
HELBROC-group together with Bulgaria, Rumania and Cyprus, where Greece has 
the role of a Framework Nation for the organization of common actions and for the 
reinforcement of interoperability and joint cooperation17. In the meantime, Greece 
has set at the disposal of the EU and NATO several naval and aerial forces, as well 
as facilities such as the multinational Athens Sealift Coordination Centre, which 
operates as a data basis on sealift capabilities and undertakes monitoring tasks about 
international transports18. The country also participates amongst ten other countries 
in programs such as the “Joint Investment Program on Innovative Concepts and 
Emerging Technologies”, which aims at promoting research cooperation, for 
example on nanotechnologies for soldier protection.  
                                                                                                                                                         
EU were limited to presence patrols and information-gathering patrols; reconnaissance tasks 
and meetings with civilian and military authorities as well as international organizations. As 
Gross (2009: 175) notes, Concordia tested operational procedures and illustrated inadequate 
coordination with other EU bodies at FYROM (such as the European Agency for 
Reconstruction or the EU Monitoring Mission). However, as Gross (ibid.) underlines, “the 
attainment of a working EU-NATO relationship and the implementation of a comprehensive 
approach to crisis management represented two challenges that the mission could not fully 
meet”.  
16 At the London Conference about Afghanistan on 28.01.2010 most countries contributed to 
the US “war on terrorism” and to the campaign for the Afghanistan’s state restructuring. 
Greece contributed with an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, two medical teams, 53 
people for Kabul’s International Airport, the amount of 3 millions for the Afghan National 
Army and 600.000 for the «Helicopter Initiative» (see 
http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/). 
17 According to data taken from the Ministry of Defence, Greece’s national contribution in 
the accomplishment of the Military Headline Goal consists of one Headquarter at Brigade 
level and a Brigade of 3.550 men, as well as naval and aerial forces, such as 2 frigates, 4 
missile boats, one fleet oiler, one oceanographic survey vessel, and two amphibious warfare 
ships, one mine sweeper, one fleet support ship, one submarine and one naval cooperation 
aircraft, F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters, six reconnaissance and surveillance RF-4 aircraft 
and four C-130 transport aircraft. 
(http://www.mod.mil.gr/Pages/MainAnalysisPage3.asp?HyperLinkID=3&MainLinkID=50&
SubLinkID=146). 
18 See http://www.geetha.mil.gr/media/pdf-arxeia/poskestham/POSKESTHAM-AMSCC.pdf 
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At the same time, several public or privatized Greek defence industries, 
which produce both for the defence and the commercial field, are involved into 
European programs of defence partnerships. Because of the increasing competition 
between defence industries, this participation offers advantages in the level of 
technology, research, management and countervailing benefits (Ntokos et al. 2007: 
28). In the frame of the common European defence programs, Greece joins several 
EU-projects, such as the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS). 
MUSIS has been launched by six European Union Member States: Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Spain. The program illustrates the trend towards 
the diffusion of military and policing tasks19, aims through observation satellites at 
the development of a space-based imaging system, in order to monitor specific 
situations and ensure strategic watch, to support prevention, to anticipate crises and 
provide planning and operational assistance20.  
2) The ESDP-Greek treatment of migration. An important problem that 
Greece is facing because of its geographical position is the migration wave from the 
Greek borders to other European countries and the EU through Frontex is also 
involved. The adoption in 2003 of the Dublin Convention has special consequences 
for border countries like Greece. Dublin Regulation requires that the first country, in 
which a person enters, is responsible for dealing with the application and also that if 
a person is arrested as “illegal” inside a country, that person is transferred back to 
the first reception country21. Therefore, the role of border countries that have also 
signed the Schengen Agreement such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Malta for the 
regulation of migration in Europe is essential as they are often transitional places 
before the final destination in other EU countries. European Commission requires 
from borders and transition countries, to adapt to strategies of the Dublin 
Regulation. Although Greece is sponsored for such purposes by the European 
Refugee Fund22, NGOs have criticized the Greek authorities for the system of 
migration’s treatment and asylum seeking, for its lack of infrastructure at reception 
centers, the bad hygienic and living conditions, for delays to asylum dispensations 
and inadequate mechanisms during examination of applications.  
Greek national borders from Turkey constitute also Europe’s sea-borders. 
The Aegean-islands of the borderline are often first intermediate destinations for 
immigrants travelling through Turkey to Greece and to other European countries. 
This is one of the most common but also complicated routes of immigrants to 
European territory. Dramatic data show that between 1988 and August 2009, 1.315 
                                                            
19 As Alexander Weis, EDA’s Chief Executive stated, “aim of the project is the connection 
between military and civil space agendas”, (see 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=456). 
20 Information about MUSIS at Ministére de la Défence, www.defense.gouv.fr 
21 For the Dublin Regulation, see The UN Refugee Agency 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a9d13d59.html 
22 See European Refugee Fund, Multiannual Program 2008-201, Greece  
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people died in the Aegean-zone between Greece and Turkey, 823 registered as 
missing, while the “dark number” of the dead is estimated much higher (Trubeta 
2010: 2). In cooperation with Frontex stationed in Greece, Greek police and a series 
of Greek marine and air-force agencies, undertake joint surveillance, control and 
arrest operations. For instance, “Operation Poseidon” in the Aegean Sea in 2007 was 
organized by the Greek government and supported by Frontex, an operation in more 
than six islands, Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Patmos, Leros and Kos. The refugees 
arrested in those islands were either transferred to Athens deportation centers or kept 
at reception centers, for instance at Lesvos “Pagani Center”, where they were kept 
and subjected to numerous administrative mechanisms and controls23.  
Although Frontex is still subjected to the principal of national sovereignty of 
the EU-states and does not intervene with decision making about migration 
management, border-zones such as the Aegean-sea and the intensification of 
surveillance through a variety of means tend to a blurring of the limits between the 
military and the police, or between “search and rescue” operations, like those 
undertaken by Greek “Super Puma” and Frontex Helicopters and operations of 
deportation. These developments result into a complex network between EU-
policing institutions and the Greek state with its various military and police agents. 
This cooperation, however, is limited to the treatment of migration and does not 
extend to more subtle issues relating to the disputes and rivalries for the precise 
determination of sea-borders between Greece and Turkey.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
23 As Trubeta (2010: 4) notes, the Pagani Center corresponded to three levels of action, the 
local level, the one of the Greek nation-state that cooperates with the EU or Frontex and, 
finally, a level of global governmentality. The problematic situation at the border-islands of 
the Aegean sea rises a series of important questions about international human rights, the 
management of the spreading phenomenon of “forced migration” and demonstrates a 
European migration policy based mostly on two processes: First, the criminalization of 
people coming from belligerent countries, such as Afghanistan or Iraq where “humanitarian” 
actions take place and their treatment simply as “bodies to be managed”, for instance within 
the so called “screening centers”. In the “screening centers” their genetic characteristics are 
registered and they receive a “personal identity”, through which they can be controlled, 
regardless if they hold legal documents or not (ibid.). Second, on the increasing 
militarization of borders through the complex and simultaneous action of different border-
institutions and agents, whose actions often overlap and necessitate each other (ibid.).  
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5. Final Remarks 
 
ESDP is everything but an integrated or completed project. The 
international conditions of the post-Cold War era and the struggles for power in the 
instability of globalization, the role of emerging ruling powers such as China, Russia 
and India, the dynamics of Turkey and Iran, as well as unsolved problems like the 
Israel-Palestine conflict and the Afghanistan-Pakistan war, compose the 
international conditions, in which the EU seeks to adjust. Europeanist optimistic 
views see the EU as capable of “maintaining stable European relations with Russia, 
with Islam and the Middle East and, above all, China”, and as “willing” to undertake 
the “heavy responsibility” of “becoming a superpower” (Haseler 2004: 192). 
However, a supposed EU project directed to increase its influence worldwide and 
demand more than simply an economic union under neoliberal premises, does not 
seem realistic without a concrete and applicable in facts foreign policy. The 
heterogeneity, the political deficits, the distance of interests and common 
understandings, the lack of social coherence and power of persuasion, the 
hierarchies between EU-countries and the shallow, top-down institutional structures, 
seem to remain insuperable obstacles.  
By fulfilling its obligations towards NATO and the EU, Greece keeps a 
Euro-Atlantic orientation until now, for its governments have traditionally 
considered these alliances as necessary for the country’s security and economic 
reproduction. The Cyprus-problem, the high defence expenditure and the frictions 
with Turkey in the Aegean-sea, which are the three interrelated problems that 
Greece is facing, have not been decisively affected by Europeanization and they 
remain to a great degree national. In an era of international openings, of 
reconfiguration of power coalitions and of quest for new alliances, it seems that 
Greece’s Europeanization is no longer enough for the resolution of these problems 
and for its active involvement to the new international circumstances. For reasons of 
political stability and economic extension and in order to strengthen its role as a 
regulating actor in the area, Greece has supported the European perspective for the 
Balkans and has invested on promoting the rhetoric of the historical bonds and the 
common Greek-Balkan traditions. However, in the frame of Turkey’s declared aims 
towards the strengthening of its influence at the Balkans-zone, Greece may face the 
challenge of searching for new strategies and ways of increasing its influence at the 
area and re-evaluate its foreign policy (Kotzias 2010: 127). Greece’s role at ESDP-
operations at the Balkans and at the Middle East is likely to increase. But as long as 
ESDP remains limited to its scope, the role of peripheral countries like Greece will 
remain at the level of simply implementing bureaucracy and participating unawares 
and mechanically, as bodies of a greater governmentality network and of neoliberal 
ideologies of “good governance” and state restructuring. 
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